World Hunger and International Justice

PHIL 2075
Introduction to Applied Ethics
with Professor Kristin Andrews

Fall, 2003

In the following essay, I will propose that we are not only responsible for the way in which our actions affect those in the global community, we are also responsible for preventing harm in our global community. Using arguments adopted from Peter Singer’s essay, Famine, Affluence and Morality, I will argue that our passive attitudes towards global poverty are ungrounded and unjustified.

My argument goes as follows:

1. We live in a global community in which our actions greatly affect the lives

of others.

2. If we have the power to prevent evil from happening in our community, we ought morally to do so.

3. Starvation is an evil.

4. therefore, we ought morally to prevent starvation in our global community.

My first premise is meant to explain the relationship we have with the people not only in our immediate community, but our global community. In the past two decades, our international relations have tightened. The media, especially American media, stretches to almost every region of the globe. Transnational corporations like Coca-Cola, Nike and Macdonald’s have set up shop in the majority of the nations on our planet. The internet and world news corporations give us access to information about current events and politics in countries all over the world, so we can no longer claim ignorance to the plight of another nation. Not only are we aware of the business of other countries, our actions as consumers can contribute to the wealth or lack of wealth of another country. In Thomas W Pogge’s essay, Eradicating Systemic Poverty, Pogge further illustrates this interconnected relationship:

“the global poor live within a worldwide states system based on internationally recognized territorial domains, interconnected though a global network of market trade and diplomacy.”(Pogge, 605).

We affect the global poor through loans and trades, military aid, tourism and through the exportation of media and culture (Pogge, 606). Understanding this relationship is fundamental to the way in which we understand our responsibilities and obligations. I included this premise so there would be no discrepancy as to why we should be helping in the first place. I can appeal to the idea that Pogge illustrates in his essay. Not only are we failing to help others in distress, which is a moral obligation in itself, we are contributing to the impoverishment of others (604).

My second premise is my moral claim, which I base on the Utilitarian principle that we should always act in a way that maximizes pleasure and minimizes pain. Peter Singer argues that, “if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.”(Singer, 573). He illustrates this by saying that if we see someone drowning, it would be morally wrong not to save them because you are wearing an expensive suit. You should save the person even if you suit would get ruined because the suit is not of a comparable moral significance. It would logically follow from this that instead of buying an expensive suit for fashion purposes as opposed to the purpose of staying warm, you should send the money to someone who will die from starvation in another country. The pleasure of looking fashionable in a new expensive suit does not outweigh the pain of starvation and death that will result in you buying it. Or you can look at it in another way: The suffering of the sweatshop worker who made the suit greatly outweighs the pleasure you get from buying it.

I would hope that my third premise does not come across as controversial, but it seems that it is not a universally accepted truth that starvation is evil. Nutrition and sustenance is a basic human right; even democratic governments that rule to protect such rights as freedom of speech and universal suffrage, still do nothing to protect those who are starving on their streets. It seems that if someone were to attack a premise in this argument, it would not be this one, but our actions speak otherwise. We don’t see starvation as an evil because we don’t see it as a priority. It should be a priority when a country has to use their farmland for cotton or coffee, so they can export it to western nations instead of using the land to grow food for themselves and the people in their own country.

In conclusion to my argument, my fourth premise states that because we ought to prevent evil our community, which is a global community, and starvation is an evil, we must prevent starvatiosustenanceustinence where it is possible to do so.

The first place to attack this argument would be to say that we do not live in a global community. Our actions don’t affect those in other countries, let alone provinces or states. We might be obligated to those in our community, but not in other countries. In John Arthur’s article, Famine Relief and the Ideal Moral Code, he responds to Singer’s suggestion that we are just as obligated to help the young boy starving in another country as we are in saving the drowning person in front of us. He suggests that we are more likely to help members in our own community because we are more aware of our own neighborhoods.

This opposition is unjustified. As I illustrated earlier, we are aware of what is going on. It is not excusable to say that because it is not happening in front of our face, we do not have to do anything about it.

The second premise would question our ideas of obligations. Many of us do not feel that we are obligated to help others in our community. Arthur claims that Singer’s moral code only speaks about obligation and ignores the concept of entitlement and ‘just deserts’. In other words, it is a code of obligation without a system of reward and punishment. If there are two farmers, one of them works all year and earns his good crop while the other lazes around all summer while his crops wither from neglect, under Singer’s moral code, the good farmer would be morally obligated to give half of his crop to the lazy farmer. There are no just deserts in this situation. Arthur also suggests that it would be foolish to endanger our well being and the well being of our family because we are vested in self-interest. He sees that under Singer’s code, because we have two kidneys, we would be obligated to give one away.

What Arthur doesn’t seem to understand is that in this situation, we are the lazy farmers who sit around while everyone works for us. Transnational corporations build their factories in countries that have lax worker protection laws so they can pay people slave wages in order to maximize their profit. The money is then brought back to the corporation and country of origin instead of those who earned it. Arthur also uses extreme examples. You would not be obligated to donate one of your kidneys to charity because it would drastically shorten your life.

I doubt that many would attempt to argue against the third premise, but as I said before, our actions show otherwise. It is possible that we all regard starvation as an evil, but it seems that we don’t see it as a very big evil. There are bigger evils to us, like having to wear the same jacket we did last year or having cable that isn’t digital. It seems that it is just passive ignorance, but we cannot say that we don’t know that most of the people in the world are poor.

In conclusion, I have shown that we are obligated to aid in the fight against world hunger, not only because we contribute to it, but also because we are obligated to eliminate pain and suffering if it is in our power to do so.

Bibliography
Arthur, John. Famine Relief and the Ideal Moral Code. (1996) As found in the book,

“Ethics in Practice”. Hugh LaFollette (ed.). Blackwell Publishing: 2002.

Goodin, Robert. Free Movement: If People Were Money. As found in the book,

“Ethics in Practice”. Hugh LaFollette (ed.). Blackwell Publishing: 2002.

Pogge, Thomas W. Eradicating Systemic Poverty: Brief for a Global Resources

Dividend. As found in the book, “Ethics in Practice”. Hugh LaFollette (ed.). Blackwell Publishing: 2002.

Singer, Peter. Famine, Affluence and Morality. As found in the book,

“Ethics in Practice”. Hugh LaFollette (ed.). Blackwell Publishing: 2002.