versus: free will, moral accountability and personal identity

PHIL 2170
MAR 30, 2003

In Harry G. Frankfurt’s paper, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, he discusses not only what makes us a person, but how the term applies to moral responsibility. Frankfurt’s arguments show that even if determinism were true, we could still be held responsible for our actions. In this essay, I will discuss Frankfurt’s idea of a person, freedom of the will and personal identity.

Frankfurt begins by discussing the term, ‘person’ and how its uses have failed in the past. When other philosophers have used the term, they seem to either include or exclude more agents then they should. In doing so, they fail to articulate its true meaning thereby damaging our philosophical language. Because the concept of personhood is so fundamental to every basic aspect of human life and to philosophy, it is crucial that ‘person’ be defined. The definition he critiques, which has been used by many philosophers is one that attributes personhood to agents having both psychological features, or consciousness and corporeal features or a physical body. This can apply not only to humans, but animals and small children. For Frankfurt, the inclusion of such agents would be misleading. He seems to imply in his essay that the term ‘person’ is one with a moral connotation. To illustrate the distinction between a person and a non-person, Frankfurt first discusses the different orders of desires.

A first-order desire is simply a desire to do or refrain from doing one thing or another. For example, the desire to eat, sleep, have sex or study are all desires of the first order. Many animals are capable of these kinds of desires, “but no animal other than man appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires”[1].

First-order desires can conflict with others and also vary in degree of strength or urgency. Often when a person has conflicting desires, they have the capacity to evaluate them and judge whether the desires are favorable or unfavorable. When an agent has a desire about a desire, Frankfurt calls them desires of the second order. For example, we can have the first-order desire to concentrate on our homework. We can also have the first-order desire to watch television. We can reflect on our desires and say that we like the desire to concentrate on homework and we do not like the desire to watch television. The desire for the desire to work is a second-order desire.

What Frankfurt believes is essential to being a person though, is not the formation of second-order desires, for desires of the second order are of two types. The first, as I just previously discussed, is when someone wants or doesn’t want a certain desire. The second type is what Frankfurt terms, a ‘second-order volition’. This is when a person wants a desire to be his will.

To explain how second-order volitions are necessary for personhood, Frankfurt introduces the term ‘Wanton’, an agent that lacks the ability to form second-order volitions, whether or not he is able to form desires of the second order. This agent does not care about his will. His desires move him to action, “without its being true of him either that he wants to be moved by these desires or that he prefers to be moved by other desires.”[2] The class of wanton includes all non-human animals and young children. Having no second-order volitions does not mean that a wanton will act spontaneously to a first order desire. The wanton may be delayed by conflicting desires or lack an opportunity to act. It is not that the wanton cannot reason or strategize in order to obtain their desires, it is that they do not care which desire is to be their will.

This notion becomes clearer when Frankfurt offers the example of the two narcotic addicts. Both of the addicts share the same physical makeup, and both have conflicting first-order desires to take and refrain from taking the drug. The first unwilling addict wishes that the desire to refrain from taking the drug be his will, but the second addict is a wanton. The wanton addict has no care which desire loses or what his will is to be. This concept of the wanton might be difficult to understand until you apply it to the idea of identity and responsibility.

The unwilling addict identifies himself with the second-order volition to refrain from taking the drug. Doing this, he withdraws himself from the desire to take the drug and admits that when he does consume it, it is a force other than his own that drives his will. By identifying with certain desires and rejecting others, we define ourselves as individuals. As Charles Taylor puts it, “if we think of what we are as defined by our goals, by what we desire to encompass or maintain, than a person on this view is one who can raise the question: do I really want to be what I now am?”[3] This would explain why we are more weary when we are judged by our actions and not by our wills. It is only when we have second-order volitions can we appreciate freedom of the will or experience lack of freedom. We can acknowledge when we are acting of our own will, or a force outside of us. In the case of the unwilling addict, he identifies with the desire to refrain from taking the drug and experiences the lack of free will when he consumes the drug.

The consequence of losing our will, to Frankfurt is losing our personhood. This can occur when we have two conflicting, second-order desires and we cannot form a second-order volition. “This condition, if it is so severe that it prevents him from identifying himself in a sufficiently decisive way with any of his conflicting first order desires, destroys him as a person.”[4] When a person cannot attain their desired goals, they experience the frustration of lacking freedom of the will. Frankfurt believes that when this happens, the person’s will is either paralyzed or continues on without the participation of its individual.

Frankfurt’s concept of a person seems to exclude more agents than at first I wanted to allow. The uneasiness of calling young children, animals or even sometimes humans non-persons seems to be a degenerative activity when practicing ethical theory. This is only because Frankfurt is looking at moral responsibility in a different light than we are normally accustomed to. Traditionally, we attribute personhood with rights and protection or freedoms. We shouldn’t harm young children because they are moral creatures with rights. Many argue that animals, especially of higher orders like primates should be called persons and therefore are given the security that we will not intentionally bring harm to them, but Frankfurt is looking at who is to be held responsible for their motives. If a person steals because he enjoys it, or enjoys his desire to steal, then he should be held more accountable than someone who has the desire to steal but wishes that the desire to refrain from stealing be his will. This is similar to Frankfurt’s argument in his essay, “Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”. Even if we act with no other possible alternatives, and determinism were true, it is our motives that hold us accountable and not our actions. The example that Professor Garrett used in his March 4^th 2003 lecture was of a man who was coerced into assassinating the president. If the man was given no other option (death not being an option) but to assassinate the president, we wouldn’t hold him morally responsible. On the other hand, if the man had already planned to assassinate the president and had the motive before he was threatened, then he would be held morally responsible. Even if we are determined to act by forces other than our own, whether they be drugs, evil scientists or other bugbears[5] we still can accept or reject our actions and be accountable for our motives or what we wish our wills to be.

Frankfurt’s theory is successful because it allows for many things. It allows for the compatibility between free will and determinism by showing that a person can lose or gain their freedom. It draws a distinction between freedom of the will (or the freedom to want to want) and freedom of action (freedom to do what you please). It also allows for moral accountability if determinism is true, which is the most important, but subtle idea in this Frankfurt piece. Some of the ideas seem controversial, but only when Frankfurt uses words like ‘person’ in contexts that we are not accustomed to. Some people would say that the person who did not want to steal or kill, or did so against their will, should still be held as responsible as the person who liked or accepted their desire to steal or kill. But we can all agree that there are parts of ourselves that no matter how hard we try to win against them, we are still moved by their forces. Frankfurt’s theory is a positive one though, because we are not the aspects we despise of ourselves, we are the struggle that rises against them.